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Available online 31 March 2007Although regions within themedial frontal cortex are known to be active
during voluntarymovements their precise role remains unclear. Here we
combine functional imaging localisation with psychophysics to demon-
strate a strikingly selective contralesional impairment in the ability to
inhibit ongoing movement plans in a patient with a rare lesion involving
the right pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), but sparing the
supplementary motor area (SMA). We find no corresponding delay in
simple reaction times, and show that the inhibitory deficit is sensitive to
the presence of competition between responses. The findings demon-
strate that the pre-SMA plays a critical role in exerting control over
voluntary actions in situations of response conflict. We discuss these
findings in the context of a unified framework of pre-SMA function, and
explore the degree to which extant data on this region can be explained
by this function alone.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc.
Introduction
A region within the medial frontal cortex – seemingly at the
interface between pre-frontal and motor systems – has become the
focus of great interest in recent years. The supplementary motor
complex (SMC) occupies a rostrally ill-defined area of mesial
agranular frontal cortex immediately anterior to Brodmann Area 4
(BA 4) (Freund, 1996; Picard and Strick, 1996; Zilles et al., 1996).
Within this region, a fractionation into at least two, functionally
distinct divisions – the pre-supplementarymotor area (pre-SMA) and
the more caudal supplementary motor area (SMA) proper (Matsu-
zaka et al., 1992) – is strongly suggested both on grounds of
cytoarchitectonics (Matelli et al., 1991; Vorobiev et al., 1998) and
strikingly different cortical and subcortical connectivity (Behrens
et al., 2006; Inase et al., 1999; Johansen-Berg et al., 2004; Luppino
et al., 1993; Morel et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2005). Unlike its rostral
counterpart, the SMA is somatotopically organised (Chainay et al.,
2004; He et al., 1995), has direct projections to spinal cord (He et al.,
1995; Luppino et al., 1994) and primarymotor cortex (Luppino et al.,
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Open access under CC BY license.1993), but receives no pre-frontal inputs (Luppino et al., 1993). By
contrast, the pre-SMA has extensive pre-frontal connectivity
(Luppino et al., 1993; Wang et al., 2005), a feature shared by the
supplementary eye field (SEF) (Tehovnik et al., 2000), a region found
at the pre-SMA/SMA border (Grosbras et al., 1999; Yamamoto et al.,
2004) with marked activity during eye movements, but functional
characteristics not dissimilar from the pre-SMA (Coe et al., 2002;
Fujii et al., 2002; Husain et al., 2003; Isoda and Tanji, 2003).
There are good anatomical grounds, then, for the wide range of
“higher” functions in which this region – and the pre-SMA in
particular – has been implicated: language generation (Binder et al.,
1997; Wise et al., 1991), movement recognition and ideation
(Grafton et al., 1996; Stephan et al., 1995), maintaining working
memory (Pollmann and von Cramon, 2000), establishing visuomo-
tor associations (Sakai et al., 1999), learning and performing
movement sequences (Hikosaka et al., 1996; Isoda and Tanji, 2004;
Kawashima et al., 1998; Nakamura et al., 1998, 1999; Sakai et al.,
1998; Shima and Tanji, 1998, 2000), time perception and
discrimination (Coull et al., 2004; Pastor et al., 2006), “internally”
guided action (Deiber et al., 1991; Frith et al., 1991; Hadland et al.,
2001; Lau et al., 2006), representing action intentions (Lau et al.,
2004), conflict resolution or monitoring (Garavan et al., 2003;
Nachev et al., 2005; Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001), and
switching between action sets (Kennerley et al., 2004; Matsuzaka
and Tanji, 1996; Rushworth et al., 2002; Shima et al., 1996).
However, it is possible that the multiplicity of functions these data
have been interpreted as indicating is in fact a multiplicity of aspects
of amuch smaller range of fundamental functions, possibly even just
one: the resolution of competition between motor plans so that a
unitary action may emerge.
It may be argued that such a process of resolving competition
between conflicting motor plans is fundamental to action control
(Botvinick et al., 2001). At any point in time, we are faced with a
choice of actions, the majority of which are either incompatible or
likely to interact with one other. A critical question is therefore how
one action is selected in favour of another. Positing a brain area that
chooses the specific neural circuit required to execute the action
leads to an infinite regress: one would have to explain what chooses
its choice, and so on ad infinitum. Much more plausibly, the action
Fig. 1. Lesion localisation. (A) Activation in the region of the SEF – a
marker for the rostral extent of the SMA – superimposed on T1-weighted
anatomical scan normalised in MNI space (orange). The purple area
identifies the location of the rostral pre-SMA region which we have
previously shown to be activated by changing oculomotor plans during
conflict. (B–D) Sagittal, axial and coronal anatomical slices showing the
extent of the lesion.
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of contingent condition–action associations whose neural repre-
sentations are variously activated by current external stimuli as well
as internal biases.
We use the term condition–action associations rather than the
more conventionally used ‘stimulus–response (S–R) associations’
for a specific reason. S–R associations refer to the links between an
action and a particular stimulus in the environment, e.g. stop at a
red light. In experimental situations, animals are often required to
learn, by trial and error, the appropriate response for a particular
arbitrary stimulus, e.g. move hand to top right when there is a red
circle but to bottom left when there is a blue square. Positive or
negative feedback following the animal’s response to each of these
stimuli leads to the development of strong S–R associations. These
associations need not only involve external stimuli, but also an
internal state or combinations of many external stimuli and internal
states, making the term condition–action associations more
appropriate.
Critically, in a given context and at some level, a multitude of
neural representations must be co-activated automatically by
external stimuli, internal biases, and conditional associations
between the two. There can be no homunculus determining which
representation should be activated and which should not. Without a
mechanism to resolve this competition, coherent action would fail to
emerge because of interference from actions incompatible with the
one being performed. Importantly, such a mechanism does not do
any selection – as the competition itself is the selection – but merely
reinforces the winners and inhibits the losers of the competition.
If such a mechanism exists, one would expect its activity to be
sensitive to at least three things. First, and most obviously, it will
depend on the degree of incompatibility between the possible
actions whose representations are activated (degree of conflict).
Second, it will depend on how greatly one action plan is biased over
the others (degree of bias): where there is a pre-existing bias in
favour of one action, competition would be expected to be less.
Third, it will vary with the number of condition–action associations
concurrently activated (condition–action dimensionality) in a
context-specific fashion depending on attention and other processes
that may introduce bias towards specific behavioural sets.
This framework allows us to make specific and testable
predictions. If the pre-SMA is indeed involved in this conflict-
resolving process, we would expect its inactivation to lead to a
deficit in the ability to select one movement over another when two
movement plans are concurrently activated. Using a manual
paradigm designed to expose such a deficit (Husain et al., 2003;
Logan et al., 1984), we therefore tested a rare patient with a unilateral
lesion involving the whole of the right pre-SMA, but – as we
demonstrate by functional imaging – entirely sparing the SMA
proper, allowing for a dissociation between the two areas. We also
show that the patient’s lesion incorporates a region of the pre-SMA
responsive to conflict identified by functional imaging of the same
basic paradigm (Nachev et al., 2005).
Patient and methods
Patient AG, a previously fit right-handed woman, presented aged
52 following two generalised seizures. Neurological examination
was unremarkable. Structural MRI revealed a right dorsomedial
frontal lesion whose margins functional MRI confirmed to be
anteromedial to hand primary motor cortex. A tumour (grade 2
oligoastrocytoma) was surgically completely removed in conjunc-tion with intra-operative electrical stimulation ensuring that none of
the areas designated for resection could elicit a motor response.
Immediately after the operation, there was motor neglect of the left
upper limb which resolved spontaneously. The experiments
described here were performed 22 months after surgery when the
patient was entirely asymptomatic. At this stage routine clinical
examination was normal, including simple bimanual tasks such as
in-phase and out-of-phase hand tapping with vision occluded
(Stephan et al., 1999). However, the patient showed some subtle left-
sided abnormalities when performing out-of-phase sequential hand
movements on Luria’s bimanual hand co-ordination task, also with
vision occluded (Luria, 1966). Follow-up imaging 4 years after
diagnosis has failed to show any evidence of recurrence.
Ten right-handed normal subjects with comparable performance
on simple reaction task measures were used as controls. The study
was approved by the local ethics committee and all subjects gave
informed, written consent.
Imaging
The lesionwasmanually traced onwhat was an otherwise normal
T1-weighted 1×1×2 mm MPRAGE sequence at 1×1×2 mm
resolution obtained 22 months after surgery on a 1.5 T Siemens
Magnetom Vision system (see Fig. 1). The brain volume image was
then transformed to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute T1
template using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ac.uk/spm) non-linear
coregistration routines. So as to avoid lesion-induced distortion,
the normalisation parameters were derived only from normal brain
regions (Brett et al., 2001).
The border between the pre-SMA and the SMA proper has been
found to correspond reasonably well to the VCA line (Zilles et al.,
Fig. 2. Schematic of the change-of-plan paradigm. Stimuli are not drawn to
scale.
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which local sulcal patterns offer no reliable clues (Picard and
Strick, 1996), making it hard to differentiate between these two
areas with conventional imaging (Behrens et al., 2006). We wanted
to establish whether the area of the SMA representing the hand was
intact. Since manual movements can cause pre-SMA and SEF
activation (the latter as a result of actual or suppressed gaze shifts),
instead of imaging hand movements we used eye movements to
localise the SEF which is rostral to the hand area of the
somatopically organised SMA (Grosbras et al., 1999; Yamamoto
et al., 2004). We did this by running a functional series of images
contrasting blocks of saccades performed in the dark with blocks of
rest (see Fig. 1A, orange). These data were collected with a T2*-
weighted echo-planar sequence (TR=4.3 s, 40 axial slices,
resolution 3.5×3.5×3.5 mm) in one session of 85 volumes. The
first 5 volumes were discarded to allow for magnetic saturation
effects. For the remainder of the run, the patient was aurally cued to
perform free saccades in the dark or to rest in alternating blocks
lasting 10 volumes each. Using SPM2, the functional images were
realigned, normalised to the same stereotactic space as the T1
image, and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 7 mm full-width at
half-maximum. The data were high-pass-filtered (0.0078 Hz
cutoff) to remove low-frequency signal drifts. To test for eye-
movement-related activation the data were entered into a voxel-
wise general linear model that included the experimental condi-
tions, and head movement parameters derived from the realign-
ment as effects of no interest. An appropriately weighted linear t
contrast with a threshold of p<0.05, corrected for multiple
comparisons across the brain, was used to identify voxels in the
region of the medial frontal wall corresponding to the patient’s
SEF. Eye movements were monitored using an ASL model 504
LRO infrared video-based eye tracker (Applied Science Labora-
tories, Bedford, MA) sampling at 240 Hz.
The co-registered statistical parametric map derived from this
series was superimposed on the anatomical scan to localise the SEF
in relation to the lesion. Since the images are in normalised
stereotactic space we can also demonstrate that the region of the
pre-SMA that we have previously shown to be activated by conflict
between motor plans (Nachev et al., 2005) falls well within the
lesion (see Fig. 1A, purple).
Psychophysics
All subjects viewed a computer screen placed 60 cm in front of
them and responded with either forefinger on a button box. They
performed 800 pseudorandomly ordered trials of a change-of-plan
paradigm in one session, consisting of 8 blocks (see Fig. 2).
Each trial began with a central fixation cross presented for 500–
800 ms followed by a green arrow (go cue) of 200-ms duration
which instructed the subject to make a speeded response with the
corresponding hand. On 20% of trials, the green arrow was
accompanied or succeeded by a pair of white bars (change cue),
appearing above and below it and also lasting 200 ms, which
instructed the subject to cancel the planned movement and execute a
response with the opposite hand. The interval between the two cues
(SOA) was automatically adjusted, depending on performance, by a
staircase algorithm that increased it by 50 ms after every successful
change trial, and reduced it by the same amount after every failed
change trial. So as to eliminate the confounding effects of slowing
following change trials, such trials were always succeeded by a go
trial whichwas removed from the final analysis. Subjects were askednot to correct their errors but were not penalised for doing so. On the
remaining 80% of trials, subjects simply executed the movement
indicated by the go cue (no change trials). All stimuli were
controlled using Presentation software (http://nbs.neuro-bs.com/)
running with real-time priority under Microsoft Windows 98SE on a
Toshiba SatPro 6000 laptop computer.
On a separate occasion, AG was tested on a manual ‘counter-
manding’ (or ‘stop-signal’) paradigm. She performed 900 trials
exactly as in the change-of-plan task except that she was asked to
withhold any response when she saw the change cue. Thus, in this
task, control can be evaluated in the absence of competition from
contralateral responses.
Themeasure of interest was the relation between the SOA and the
probability of successfully withholding the first response. The
staircase adjustment of the SOA ensured that we could counteract
any strategic slowing and thereby accurately evaluate subjects’
inhibition performance. To characterise the psychometric functions
we used Bayesianmethods in conjunction withMarkov chainMonte
Carlo (MCMC) sampling (Neal, 1993). These methods have been
shown to provide more accurate estimates of the parameters than
analogous frequentist approaches (Kuss et al., 2005), especially
when the number of observations is small as is necessarily the case in
psychophysical studies involving patients. The psychometric
functions were parameterised as logistic functions and maximum
a posteriori (MAP) estimates were derived as follows. For each
psychometric function, a binomial mixture model describing the
threshold, slope, and lapse rate was generated using the following
very broad prior distributions (parameters in parentheses): lapse rate:
beta (2,50), threshold: normal (200,200), slope lognormal (4,1). The
same prior was used for all functions. MCMC sampling was used to
derive 5000 samples from the posterior of which the last 4800 were
used to generate the MAP estimate and approximate Bayesian
confidence intervals for the threshold.Results
Functional localisation of the SEF (coordinates 6, −15, 52,
t=8.00, p<0.001) demonstrated the posterior extent of the lesion
to be just anterior to the SMA/pre-SMA border. Thus the lesion
spared the SMA.
On the change-of-plan task, AG’s performance revealed a
marked deficit in her ability to inhibit a response of the left hand
specifically on change trials, i.e. when she was instructed to change
Fig. 3. Behavioural data. (A) Psychometric inhibition functions for patient AG derived using the change-of-plan paradigm. The line plots show maximum a
posteriori (MAP) estimates for the relation between the probability of inhibiting the first movement and the SOA adjusted by the median RT (effectively the time
available to inhibit a response) for the left (solid line) and the right (dotted line) hands. Scatter plots of the raw data (left, white circles; right, black triangles) are
also shown. The SOAvalues were determined by a staircase tracking algorithm that targeted the 50% performance level and therefore the sampling was slightly
different between the two sides, and weighted towards the middle of the function. Only SOAvalues for which at least 5 data points were available were used. The
SOAvalues were: left, 100 ms (n=9), 150 ms (n=24), 200 ms (n=25), 250 ms (n=10); right, 100 ms (n=6), 150 ms (n=15), 200 ms (n=24), 250 ms (n=20),
300 ms (n=6). So as to generate functions describing the relation between the probability of changing response and the effective time available to do so, the
SOAs were adjusted by subtraction from the median RT on Go trials: left=458 ms, right=440 ms. The horizontal box plots show 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.95
confidence boundaries. The two functions are significantly different (Bayesian p=0.002). (B) Scatterplot of the left and right hand inhibition function 50%
thresholds for AG (filled markers) and the ten control subjects (unfilled markers), derived as described in A. AG differed from controls only on the left (two-
sample t test, p=0.011), and none of the controls showed a significant difference between left and right based on Bayesian MAP estimates.
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instructed to move her right hand (see Fig. 3A). Inhibitory
performance here is best described by the probability of inhibiting
the first response on change trials as a function of the SOA
adjusted for the median reaction time. MCMC estimates of the
threshold (50% performance) of this function were significantly
higher for the left compared with right hand (278 ms vs. 230 ms,
Bayesian p=0.002 based on MCMC sampling), a finding that was
not observed in any of the controls. Furthermore these values
differed from the controls only for the left hand (two-sample t test,
left p=0.011, right p=0.39, see Fig. 3B).
By contrast, the threshold asymmetry in the pure counter-
manding condition (in which either one or no responses were
made) was much less pronounced (216 ms for left hand vs. 198 ms,
for the right, Bayesian p=0.053 based on MCMC sampling),
demonstrating that the lateralised deficit observed in AG was
sensitive to the presence of competition between two alternative
responses, i.e. as in the change-of-plan task.
Critically, this difference between the hands was not present on
simple go reaction times (median values: left = 458 ms,
right=440 ms, two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test asymptotic
p=0.22). These reaction times did not differ significantly from
controls on either side (two-sample t test, left p=0.16, right
p=0.18), suggesting the deficit is specific to situations where
competition between actions occurs.1 In line with the peculiarly polarised pattern of dysfunction seen after
damage to large regions with medial frontal cortex (Laplane et al., 1977) –
either absence of spontaneous movement or disinhibited semi-purposeful
movement – it is conceivable that failure of inhibition following damage to
the pre-SMA requires an intact SMA in order to become manifest, as the
pre-SMA may act by inhibiting the SMA in the normal state.Discussion
This study provides the first evidence that the human pre-SMA
may be necessary for inhibiting competing single motor plans in
situations of response conflict. It is a direct test of a previous study
which found activation in a medial frontal area well within theborders of this patient’s lesion in response to conflict generated by
the same paradigm, but in the oculomotor domain (Nachev et al.,
2005). These results cannot be explained by damage to the SMA
proper as functional imaging demonstrated that this patient’s lesion
must be rostral to it.1 Although involvement of other anterior motor
areas in the periphery of the lesion, particularly the dorsal
cingulate, is possible, medial activation anterior to the VCA line
in our imaging version of this task was confined to the pre-SMA
(Nachev et al., 2005). Moreover, no adequately controlled lesion
study to date has convincingly associated damage to the cingulate
with deficits interpretable as a failure of control over immediate
action (Baird et al., 2006; Fellows and Farah, 2005; Kennerley
et al., 2006).
The pre-SMA is consistently activated in paradigms in which
conflict is explicitly induced by requiring subjects to inhibit an
established response rule in favour of another (Garavan et al., 2003;
Miller et al., 2005; Nachev et al., 2005; Rushworth et al., 2002;
Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001; Wittfoth et al., 2006; Wolbers et
al., 2006). Although such paradigms have sometimes used
sequences, similar activation profiles are generated with single
responses. Indeed, the most elemental paradigm – a race between
two incompatible actions is sufficient to produce robust pre-SMA
activity (Garavan et al., 2003; Nachev et al., 2005; Ullsperger and
von Cramon, 2001), which is not even dependent on the subjects’
having any conscious awareness of conflict (Wolbers et al., 2006).
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relation to active movement to account for the kind of inhibitory
process we describe (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Matsuzaka
et al., 1992). However, all that is required is that the timing of
activity should be within the period when competing condition–
action associations are co-activated. This need not be at the
execution stage, indeed it would seem inefficient for resolution to
occur so late. In any case, there is direct evidence of pre-SMA
involvement during the preparation or execution of action (Isoda,
2005; Luppino et al., 1991; Nakamura et al., 1998). For example, it
has been shown that when monkeys are taught to perform a simple
delayed saccadic task, microstimulation of the pre-SMA in the pre-
saccadic interval modulates saccadic latency in a context-dependent
way (Isoda, 2005). Interestingly, when microstimulation was
applied in close proximity to the go signal saccade initiation was
globally delayed, whereas microstimulation earlier in the delay
period led to shorter latency saccades for contraversive targets.
This is the kind of activity we would expect if the pre-SMA is
suppressing competing plans. But even more directly, it has been
shown that interfering with the function of the pre-SMA specifically
alters switching from one condition–action association to another
(Nakamura et al., 1999; Rushworth et al., 2002; Shima and Tanji,
1998). Furthermore, a recent report has shown remarkable single cell
activity in the pre-SMA that is sensitive to switches between
condition–action associations in a saccadic task switch paradigm
(Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007). Importantly, the time point of
differentiation in neuronal activity between switch and non-switch
trials preceded the behavioural differentiation time by long enough
to allow this activity to affect behaviour. Indeed, microstimulation
following the cue to move resulted in significantly improved
switching behaviour, with a conduction time well within the
available time window.2
Moving beyond the specific evidence, we would suggest that the
results of studies not directly focussed on competition between
responses can also be reconciled with the unitary function we
propose for the pre-SMA. As we outline below, it seems to us that
our proposal is the most parsimonious way of explaining the large
corpus of data on this region.
Motor paradigms
The most general observation about pre-SMA activity in relation
to overt action is that it tends to favour complex acts over simple
ones (Picard and Strick, 1996). A finer and largely uncontroversial
classification is based on its modulation by three contrasts: internally
vs. externally guided, novel vs. well-learned, and sequential vs.
single. Here we show that the conflict-related activity outlined in the
Introduction can account for all of these contrasts without the need to
invoke any higher order process.
Internally vs. externally guided action
The earliest studies of voluntary action noted that when a
choice between two movements is not guided by an explicit cue in2 It should be noted that the inhibitory deficit seen in our patient is in the
context of competition between alternative movements rather than between
a movement and no movement at all. This raises the possibility that the
inhibitory failure is secondary to a failure adequately to activate the
alternative response which is normally inhibitory of any other responses.
However, it would be odd for the principal deficit here to involve processes
plausibly dominated by the contralesional hemisphere.the immediate external environment, pre-SMA activity is greater
than when such a cue is present (Deiber et al., 1991; Frith et al.,
1991). Indeed, the contrast appeared to be strongest when subjects
were not given any basis on which to choose one response over the
other and were instructed to respond “freely”. It has been tacitly
assumed that because the number of responses between the two
conditions is equated the difference in brain activation must reflect
a difference in the pathways engaged by internally and externally
triggered movements.
In fact, these conditions are very poorly equated, and no such
conclusion can be safely drawn. When subjects respond “freely” the
circumstances that determine their responses are not simpler than
when they are cued, but much more complicated, since removing an
external criterion for responding does not make the response
criterionless but merely hides the criterion from view. Critically, the
range of criteria that might determine the subject’s response –
whether consciously or not – is indefinite and is likely to be
substantially larger than in the explicitly directed condition because
it is no longer constrained by attention to a specific set of stimuli.
Thus the number of condition–action associations that are
automatically activated will be much greater, leading to greater
need for conflict resolution, as outlined in the Introduction. In
addition, this need for inhibition will be further amplified by the
absence of bias in favour of any one action (Botvinick et al., 2001).
For these reasons, the apparent specialisation for internally
guided action is much more simply explained by the same process
of inhibiting competing motor plans being manifest to a different
degree in response to differing demands. We have attempted to
disprove this argument in an experiment where response “freedom”
and response conflict were independently manipulated in the
oculomotor domain (Nachev et al., 2005). Consistent with the
hypothesis advanced here, the pre-SMA was activated by both
manipulations; however, the modulation of activity was dissoci-
able, with two close but distinct parts of the pre-SMA being
responsive to either factor but not significantly to both. It is
therefore conceivable that different processes were engaged by the
two factors, but it is also possible that different regions within the
pre-SMA were differentially engaged by the same process. Only
the finding of an interaction between the two factors in the same
brain region – which was not present–could be adduced as strong
evidence of unitary function.
A recent sophisticated study of intention does not settle the point
either (Lau et al., 2004). Adapting Libet’s paradigm (Libet et al.,
1983), subjects made freely timed movements and were asked to
attend to the correspondence between an external clock and, on
different trials in blocks, either the perceived time of the desire to
move or the time of the movement itself. The contrast between the
two revealed activation in the pre-SMA, from which the authors
concluded that they had identified a “representation of intention” in
the human brain. It may be objected, however, that merely because
subjects attended to the time when they believe they felt a desire to
move does not imply that the areas activated in their brains
represented their intention.
First, being conscious of a desire tomove is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient criterion for voluntary action (Bennett and Hacker, 2003).
One would not think of oneself as having moved involuntarily if one
were not aware of a conscious desire tomove just before themovement
itself, and, equally, one would not call a movement voluntary solely
because it was preceded by an urge to move (or else sneezing would be
a voluntary act).What the subjectswere attending to therefore cannot be
unambiguously related to anything of consequence to voluntary action.
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not necessarily activate a brain region concerned with intention, any
more than attending to one’s anger need identify a region representing
anger. Amuch simpler explanation of the data in this experiment is that
subjects attended more carefully to their actions in the blocks where
they had to attend to the timing of the “desire to move”, thereby leading
to activation of a wider range of condition–action associations and
consequently resulting in greater pre-SMA activity as previously
described.
Novel vs. well-learned action
Pre-SMA activity has been shown to be greater when novel
actions are compared with well-rehearsed ones (Hikosaka et al.,
1996; Kawashima et al., 1998; Nakamura et al., 1998), and to
decrease duringmotor learning (Sakai et al., 1999). Disruption of the
pre-SMA has been shown to interfere with the acquisition of new
sequences but possibly not established ones (Nakamura et al., 1999).
On this basis it has been proposed that the pre-SMA is critically
involved in establishing new S–R associations (Nakamura et al.,
1998; Sakai et al., 1999; Sakai et al., 1998). However, none of the
extant data allows us to distinguish a critical role in such learning
from the role in resolving conflict between condition–action
associations we have suggested.
Consider the case where an animal has to learn, by trial and error,
an appropriate motor response when confronted with a particular
sensory stimulus (or external condition). Positive or negative
feedback helps to establish strong condition–action associations as
the animal learns the correct response for each particular stimulus (or
condition). But such learning necessarily entails the inhibition of
competing responses. Moreover, the degree of inhibition will tend to
covary tightly with learning. A poorly learned association will
inevitably generate greater competition between contingent re-
sponses than a well-learned one because there will necessarily be
less bias in its favour. But as the association becomes better
established, the increased bias towards it will reduce the need for
inhibition of competing plans.
Finding a condition–action-specific pattern of activation would
not be decisive in making the distinction between learning vs.
resolving competition between motor responses, since the pattern
of inhibition may well differ depending on the array of condition–
action representations being inhibited.
One fact, however, is strongly against the learning account:
activity in the same learning-related cells reappears during switching
from one well-learned action to another (Nakamura et al., 1998),
which is clearly surprising for a purely learning-related role but
would be entirely consistent with inhibition of competing action
plans. It must nevertheless be conceded that these two accounts will
always be difficult to differentiate, as successful inhibition of
competing alternatives will clearly be essential to rehearsal on which
learning self-evidently depends.
Single vs. sequential action
Perhaps the most carefully explored aspect of the pre-SMA is its
marked activity during sequences of movements (Hikosaka et al.,
1996; Kawashima et al., 1998; Shima et al., 1996; Shima and Tanji,
1998, 2000). This has lead to the notion that the pre-SMA has a
special role in movement sequences, and, by implication, that it is
part of a neural circuit specialised for various aspects of sequential
action. Carefully considered, this notion is implausible. Virtually all
voluntary movements involve the sequential contraction of different
muscle groups that do not always operate together and are thereforeunlikely to have unitary representations at a cortical level. All action
is therefore sequential to some degree. If the SMC had a special
function in sequencing actions we would therefore expect it to show
differential activation between two “simple” movements that differ
in the number of independently operable muscle groups involved:
e.g. a reaching hand movement vs. an eye movement. This has not
been shown to be the case.
What we need to consider is the peculiar – and artificial – nature
of the movement sequence paradigms used to study this phenom-
enon. An action is considered as a sequence of movements if it is
composed of several movements that can each be – and often
habitually are –made independently: e.g. a sequence of saccades. By
contrast, the oculomotor pursuit of a target describing a smooth arc
across the visual field is not considered a sequence even though it
involves sequentially shifting changes in the contraction of the
ocular muscles. Furthermore, experimental sequences usually
require the subject to perform the same component movements
but in a different order within the same experiment: this is obviously
necessary so as to distinguish between activity due to each
component from that due to their interaction as part of a sequence.
Finally, the movements are considered a sequence – rather than just a
series of individual trials – because they are cued at the onset of the
first movement only. Thus, in these paradigms, each component
movement is associated with a cue (or some other condition) and
what differs across trial types is just the timing of its execution. The
result is that condition–action associations are established for each
component movement that initially differ only in their relative
timings, if at all. At the early stages of learning, presentation of the
initial cueing stimulus will therefore activate all condition–action
associations involved to some degree, giving rise to conflict
requiring appropriate inhibition. Since the variation between one
sequence and another is at the time point of each component
movement initiation, this is when we would expect pre-SMA
activity to occur to resolve conflict between competing motor plans.
Once the sequence is well learnt, the order of each component
becomes part of the condition on which the response is selected and
therefore there will be less requirement for conflict resolution,
resulting in reduced pre-SMA activity. The pre-SMA may therefore
facilitate the encoding of a sequence, but only to the extent to which
it inhibits alternative responses so that the sequence may be
successfully performed enough times for the encoding to take place.
There is no need to suggest it represents sequence information for
later retrieval, indeed neurons exhibiting sequence-specific activity
have recently been shown to be 6 times commoner in M1 than in the
SMC (Lu and Ashe, 2005).
Non-motor paradigms
The pre-SMA has been implicated in functions that do not
involve action by the subject. Since pre-SMA activity often precedes
movement execution it is not surprising to find that it accompanies
movements that are not executed but only imagined. Indeed, the
most detailed study of single-cell activity in the human SMC found
some neurons whose activity is greater during imagined movements
than executed ones (Amador and Fried, 2004). If this region is
involved in the suppression of competing motor plans, this is
precisely what we would expect. It would be very surprising indeed
if imagining a movement did not involve suppressing a conscious
desire to execute it.
Activity during the observation of action (Rizzolatti and
Luppino, 2001) can be explained on analogous lines. Since an
3 S. J. Anderson, personal communication.
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actions used in observation experiments – it is inevitable that
observing an action will activate neural circuits concerned with
movements intended to secure the same or similar goals. Moreover,
action observation experiments usually employ hand grasping
gestures which the subject will generally observe when performing
them himself, thereby linking the observation of an action to its
execution independently of its goal.
That it is at no point the subject’s intention to execute any of these
movements is irrelevant: the brain does not know what the subject
has been instructed to do: automatic activation will therefore occur,
requiring inhibition. Thus activity here need not have anything to do
with the recognition of action, and indeed studies showing such a
perceptual deficit following interference with the pre-SMA are
notably absent. Nor is there any necessity to invoke a mechanism for
learning from imitation, unless it can be shown that disrupting the
pre-SMA during the observation of an action subsequently impairs
its learning.
Evidence that the pre-SMA is necessary for non-motor aspects of
cognitive operations is similarly sparse. Merely correlational
evidence is hard to interpret given that cognitive paradigms almost
invariably involve a response of some sort. Moreover, paradigms
with a spatial component usually require gaze suppression, and those
with a verbal component often lead to silent or suppressed
verbalisation, both of which involve motor processing. Even when
these things are carefully controlled for (Hanakawa et al., 2002), one
would expect tasks that are cognitively more difficult to activate the
pre-SMA to a greater degree because, necessarily, in these situations
the bias towards one response compared with another is less and/or
the range of condition–action associations concurrently activated is
greater, both factors to which a competition resolving mechanism
would be expected to be sensitive, as we have already argued.
One case needs special consideration: the widespread belief that
the pre-SMA is involved in temporal discrimination. The evidence
for this rests almost entirely on functional imaging studies that have
shown activation in this area when making a temporal judgment is
contrasted with making some other kind of judgment (Coull et al.,
2004; Pastor et al., 2006). The problem is that these two conditions
are never sufficiently equated in terms of the relative propensity to
activate condition–action associations.
Just as imagining or observing an action may be expected
automatically to activate neural substrates concerned with action, so
a context more readily linked to action will result in greater activity
in these areas compared with one less so. At the time scales explored
in such experiments, by far the commonest reason for an object to
change in the temporal dimension is because it is moving. All
movement, like all action, necessarily takes place over time, which
is not true of other properties of objects such as colour, shape or size.
For this reason, wewould argue, attending to the temporal aspect of a
stimulus is much more likely to activate neural circuits concerned
with action than attending to some other aspect of it – even if no
motor act takes place.
An alternative interpretation of the activation of any motor area
during such tasks is therefore the automatic activation of condition–
action associations, and their consequent inhibition. Showing that
these effects are modulated by voluntary attention does not
overcome this criticism, as both motor and sensory unconscious
processes are sensitive to attentional manipulations (Montaser-
Kouhsari and Rajimehr, 2005; Naccache et al., 2002; Sumner et al.,
2006). Moreover, there is both behavioural (Anderson et al., 2002;
Tucker and Ellis, 1998, 2004) and neurophysiological (Grezes andDecety, 2002) evidence of motor activation in a context more subtly
related to action – the purely passive viewing of figures with
affordances – so the process we are describing here is far from
hypothetical. Even highly abstract figures with minimally lateralised
affordances can produce appropriately lateralised motor cortex
activation.3
Naturally, we are not asserting that these observations prove that
the pre-SMA is not involved in temporal discrimination or any other
perceptual task, but merely that the case has not been made. If we are
to believe that an area concerned with actions – functionally and
anatomically – is also involved in a highly specific aspect of
perception, we need better evidence than functional imaging, and
rather closer attention to confounds that may point to alternative
explanations that are both simpler and more easily reconciled with
the extant literature.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that pre-SMA injury can lead to a
selective deficit in the ability to inhibit a response in the context of
competition between actions. These findings reflect a cardinal role
for this region in the process of resolving competition between
action contingencies so that coherent behaviour may emerge. We
propose that this process alone may explain the vast bulk of extant
data on this region, and that there is therefore no need to invoke less
elemental functions in our description of the role of the pre-SMA in
action control.
Such merit as the framework proposed here has rests on its being
themost economical explanation of the facts.Naturally, the brain need
not be parsimonious in its organisation, and therefore direct evidence
of unitary function is required. One way of achieving this with
functional imaging is to explore paradigms where two putatively
dissociable processes are manipulated in a factorial manner: the
presence of an interaction between the factors would suggest that they
are not independent, although of course the absence would not
preclude it. Alternatively, and perhaps more powerfully, imaging
measures of neuronal adaptation (Grill-Spector and Malach, 2001)
could be used to test if neurons in the same location are dissociably
activated by two potentially different processes, a technique that has
shown some success in the sensory domain. In any event, it is
essential that hypotheses generated based on functional imaging are
subsequently tested with functional interference.
More generally, we would suggest that the proliferation in
functions attributed to this region should be viewed critically, and
greater efforts should be made to integrate the evidence across the
field, as we have attempted to do here.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to AG and our control participants for taking part
in this research funded by the Wellcome Trust. We thank Dr Clive
Rosenthal for his comments on the manuscript.
References
Alexander, G.E., Crutcher, M.D., 1990. Preparation for movement – neural
representations of intended direction in 3 motor areas of the monkey.
J. Neurophysiol. 64, 133–150.
Amador, N., Fried, I., 2004. Single-neuron activity in the human
T162 P. Nachev et al. / NeuroImage 36 (2007) T155–T163supplementary motor area underlying preparation for action. J. Neuro-
surg. 100, 250–259.
Anderson, S.J., Yamagishi, N., Karavia, V., 2002. Attentional processes link
perception and action. Proc. R. Soc. London, B. Biol. Sci. 269,
1225–1232.
Baird, A., Dewar, B.K., Critchley, H., Gilbert, S.J., Dolan, R.J., Cipolotti, L.,
2006. Cognitive functioning after medial frontal lobe damage including
the anterior cingulate cortex: a preliminary investigation. Brain Cogn.
60, 166–175.
Behrens, T.E., Jenkinson, M., Robson, M.D., Smith, S.M., Johansen-Berg,
H., 2006. A consistent relationship between local white matter
architecture and functional specialisation in medial frontal cortex.
NeuroImage 30, 220–227.
Bennett, M.R., Hacker, P.M.S., 2003. Philosophical Foundations of
Neuroscience. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
Binder, J.R., Frost, J.A., Hammeke, T.A., Cox, R.W., Rao, S.M., Prieto, T.,
1997. Human brain language areas identified by functional magnetic
resonance imaging. J. Neurosci. 17, 353–362.
Botvinick, M.M., Braver, T.S., Barch, D.M., Carter, C.S., Cohen, J.D., 2001.
Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychol. Rev. 108, 624–652.
Brett, M., Leff, A.P., Rorden, C., Ashburner, J., 2001. Spatial normalization
of brain images with focal lesions using cost function masking.
NeuroImage 14, 486–500.
Chainay, H., Krainik, A., Tanguy, M.L., Gerardin, E., Le Bihan, D.,
Lehericy, S., 2004. Foot, face and hand representation in the human
supplementary motor area. NeuroReport 15, 765–769.
Coe, B., Tomihara, K., Matsuzawa, M., Hikosaka, O., 2002. Visual and
anticipatory bias in three cortical eye fields of the monkey during an
adaptive decision-making task. J. Neurosci. 22, 5081–5090.
Coull, J.T., Vidal, F., Nazarian, B., Macar, F., 2004. Functional anatomy of
the attentional modulation of time estimation. Science 303, 1506–1508.
Deiber, M.P., Passingham, R.E., Colebatch, J.G., Friston, K.J., Nixon, P.D.,
Frackowiak, R.S., 1991. Cortical areas and the selection of movement: a
study with positron emission tomography. Exp. Brain Res. 84, 393–402.
Fellows, L.K., Farah, M.J., 2005. Is anterior cingulate cortex necessary for
cognitive control? Brain 128, 788–796.
Freund, H.J., 1996. Functional organization of the human supplementary
motor area and dorsolateral premotor cortex. Adv. Neurol. 70, 263–269.
Frith, C.D., Friston, K., Liddle, P.F., Frackowiak, R.S., 1991. Willed action
and the prefrontal cortex in man: a study with PET. Proc. R. Soc.
London, B. Biol. Sci. 244, 241–246.
Fujii, N., Mushiake, H., Tanji, J., 2002. Distribution of eye- and arm-
movement-related neuronal activity in the SEF and in the SMA and Pre-
SMA of monkeys. J. Neurophysiol. 87, 2158–2166.
Garavan, H., Ross, T.J., Kaufman, J., Stein, E.A., 2003. A midline dis-
sociation between error-processing and response–conflict monitoring.
NeuroImage 20, 1132–1139.
Grafton, S.T., Arbib, M.A., Fadiga, L., Rizzolatti, G., 1996. Localization
of grasp representations in humans by positron emission tomography:
2. Observation compared with imagination. Exp. Brain Res. 112,
103–111.
Grezes, J., Decety, J., 2002. Does visual perception of object afford action?
Evidence from a neuroimaging study. Neuropsychologia 40, 212–222.
Grill-Spector, K., Malach, R., 2001. fMR-adaptation: a tool for studying the
functional properties of human cortical neurons. Acta Psychol. (Amst.)
107, 293–321.
Grosbras, M.H., Lobel, E., Van de Moortele, P.F., LeBihan, D., Berthoz, A.,
1999. An anatomical landmark for the supplementary eye fields in
human revealed with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Cereb.
Cortex 9, 705–711.
Hadland, K.A., Rushworth, M.F., Passingham, R.E., Jahanshahi, M.,
Rothwell, J.C., 2001. Interference with performance of a response
selection task that has no working memory component: an rTMS
comparison of the dorsolateral prefrontal and medial frontal cortex.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 13, 1097–1108.
Hanakawa, T., Honda, M., Sawamoto, N., Okada, T., Yonekura, Y.,
Fukuyama, H., Shibasaki, H., 2002. The role of rostral Brodmann area 6in mental-operation tasks: an integrative neuroimaging approach. Cereb.
Cortex 12, 1157–1170.
He, S.Q., Dum, R.P., Strick, P.L., 1995. Topographic organization of
corticospinal projections from the frontal-lobe–motor areas on the
medial surface of the hemisphere. J. Neurosci. 15, 3284–3306.
Hikosaka, O., Sakai, K., Miyauchi, S., Takino, R., Sasaki, Y., Putz, B., 1996.
Activation of human presupplementary motor area in learning of
sequential procedures: a functional MRI study. J. Neurophysiol. 76,
617–621.
Husain, M., Parton, A., Hodgson, T.L., Mort, D., Rees, G., 2003. Self-
control during response conflict by human supplementary eye field. Nat.
Neurosci. 6, 117–118.
Inase, M., Tokuno, H., Nambu, A., Akazawa, T., Takada, M., 1999.
Corticostriatal and corticosubthalamic input zones from the presup-
plementary motor area in the macaque monkey: comparison with the
input zones from the supplementary motor area. Brain Res. 833,
191–201.
Isoda, M., 2005. Context-dependent stimulation effects on saccade initiation
in the presupplementary motor area of the monkey. J. Neurophysiol. 93,
3016–3022.
Isoda, M., Tanji, J., 2003. Contrasting neuronal activity in the supplementary
and frontal eye fields during temporal organization of multiple saccades.
J. Neurophysiol. 90, 3054–3065.
Isoda, M., Tanji, J., 2004. Participation of the primate presupplementary
motor area in sequencing multiple saccades. J. Neurophysiol. 92,
653–659.
Isoda, M., Hikosaka, O., 2007. Switching from automatic to controlled
action by monkey medial frontal cortex. Nat. Neurosci. 10, 240–248.
Johansen-Berg, H., Behrens, T.E., Robson, M.D., Drobnjak, I., Rushworth,
M.F., Brady, J.M., Smith, S.M., Higham, D.J., Matthews, P.M., 2004.
Changes in connectivity profiles define functionally distinct regions in
human medial frontal cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 101,
13335–13340.
Kawashima, R., Tanji, J., Okada, K., Sugiura, M., Sato, K., Kinomura, S.,
Inoue, K., Ogawa, A., Fukuda, H., 1998. Oculomotor sequence learning:
a positron emission tomography study. Exp. Brain Res. 122, 1–8.
Kennerley, S.W., Sakai, K., Rushworth, M.F., 2004. Organization of action
sequences and the role of the pre-SMA. J. Neurophysiol. 91, 978–993.
Kennerley, S.W., Walton, M.E., Behrens, T.E., Buckley, M.J., Rushworth,
M.F., 2006. Optimal decision making and the anterior cingulate cortex.
Nat. Neurosci. 9, 940–947.
Kuss, M., Jakel, F., Wichmann, F.A., 2005. Bayesian inference for
psychometric functions. J. Vis. 5, 478–492.
Laplane, D., Talairach, J., Meininger, V., Bancaud, J., Orgogozo, J.M., 1977.
Clinical consequences of corticectomies involving the supplementary
motor area in man. J. Neurol. Sci. 34, 301–314.
Lau, H.C., Rogers, R.D., Haggard, P., Passingham, R.E., 2004. Attention to
intention. Science 303, 1208–1210.
Lau, H., Rogers, R.D., Passingham, R.E., 2006. Dissociating response
selection and conflict in the medial frontal surface. NeuroImage 29,
446–451.
Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E.W., Pearl, D.K., 1983. Time of conscious
intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-
potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain
106, 623–642.
Logan, G.D., Cowan, W.B., Davis, K.A., 1984. On the ability to inhibit
simple and choice reaction time responses: a model and a method.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 10, 276–291.
Lu, X., Ashe, J., 2005. Anticipatory activity in primary motor cortex codes
memorized movement sequences. Neuron 45, 967–973.
Luppino, G., Matelli, M., Camarda, R.M., Gallese, V., Rizzolatti, G., 1991.
Multiple representations of body movements in mesial area 6 and the
adjacent cingulate cortex: an intracortical microstimulation study in the
macaque monkey. J. Comp. Neurol. 311, 463–482.
Luppino, G., Matelli, M., Camarda, R., Rizzolatti, G., 1993. Corticocortical
connections of area F3 (SMA-proper) and area F6 (pre-SMA) in the
macaque monkey. J. Comp. Neurol. 338, 114–140.
T163P. Nachev et al. / NeuroImage 36 (2007) T155–T163Luppino, G., Matelli, M., Camarda, R., Rizzolatti, G., 1994. Corticospinal
projections from mesial frontal and cingulate areas in the monkey.
NeuroReport 5, 2545–2548.
Luria, A.R., 1966. Higher Cortical Functions in Man. Tavistock, London.
Matelli, M., Luppino, G., Rizzolatti, G., 1991. Architecture of superior and
mesial area 6 and the adjacent cingulate cortex in the macaque monkey.
J. Comp. Neurol. 311, 445–462.
Matsuzaka, Y., Tanji, J., 1996. Changing directions of forthcoming arm
movements: neuronal activity in the presupplementary and supplementary
motor area of monkey cerebral cortex. J. Neurophysiol. 76, 2327–2342.
Matsuzaka, Y., Aizawa, H., Tanji, J., 1992. A motor area rostral to the
supplmentary motor area (presupplementary motor area) in the monkey:
neuronal activity during a learned motor task. J. Neurophysiol. 68,
653–662.
Miller, L.M., Sun, F.T., Curtis, C.E., D’Esposito, M., 2005. Functional
interactions between oculomotor regions during prosaccades and
antisaccades. Hum. Brain Mapp. 26, 119–127.
Montaser-Kouhsari, L., Rajimehr, R., 2005. Subliminal attentional modula-
tion in crowding condition. Vision Res. 45, 839–844.
Morel, A., Liu, J., Wannier, T., Jeanmonod, D., Rouiller, E.M., 2005.
Divergence and convergence of thalamocortical projections to premotor
and supplementary motor cortex: a multiple tracing study in the macaque
monkey. Eur. J. Neurosci. 21, 1007–1029.
Naccache, L., Blandin, E., Dehaene, S., 2002. Unconscious masked priming
depends on temporal attention. Psychol. Sci. 13, 416–424.
Nachev, P., Rees, G., Parton, A., Kennard, C., Husain, M., 2005. Volition
and conflict in human medial frontal cortex. Curr. Biol. 15, 122–128.
Nakamura, K., Sakai, K., Hikosaka, O., 1998. Neuronal activity in medial
frontal cortex during learning of sequential procedures. J. Neurophysiol.
80, 2671–2687.
Nakamura, K., Sakai, K., Hikosaka, O., 1999. Effects of local inactivation of
monkey medial frontal cortex in learning of sequential procedures.
J. Neurophysiol. 82, 1063–1068.
Neal, R.M., 1993. Probabilistic Inference using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Methods. Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto.
Pastor, M.A., Macaluso, E., Day, B.L., Frackowiak, R.S., 2006. The neural
basis of temporal auditory discrimination. NeuroImage 30, 512–520.
Picard, N., Strick, P.L., 1996. Motor areas of the medial wall: a review of
their location and functional activation. Cereb. Cortex 6, 342–353.
Pollmann, S., von Cramon, D.Y., 2000. Object working memory and
visuospatial processing: functional neuroanatomy analyzed by event-
related fMRI. Exp. Brain Res. 133, 12–22.
Rizzolatti, G., Luppino, G., 2001. The cortical motor system. Neuron 31,
889–901.
Rushworth, M.F., Hadland, K.A., Paus, T., Sipila, P.K., 2002. Role of the
human medial frontal cortex in task switching: a combined fMRI and
TMS study. J. Neurophysiol. 87, 2577–2592.
Sakai, K., Hikosaka, O., Miyauchi, S., Takino, R., Sasaki, Y., Putz, B., 1998.
Transition of brain activation from frontal to parietal areas in visuomotor
sequence learning. J. Neurosci. 18, 1827–1840.
Sakai, K., Hikosaka, O., Miyauchi, S., Sasaki, Y., Fujimaki, N., Putz, B.,
1999. Presupplementary motor area activation during sequence learning
reflects visuo-motor association. J. Neurosci. 19, RC1.
Shima, K., Tanji, J., 1998. Both supplementary and presupplementary motorareas are crucial for the temporal organization of multiple movements.
J. Neurophysiol. 80, 3247–3260.
Shima, K., Tanji, J., 2000. Neuronal activity in the supplementary and
presupplementary motor areas for temporal organization of multiple
movements. J. Neurophysiol. 84, 2148–2160.
Shima, K., Mushiake, H., Saito, N., Tanji, J., 1996. Role for cells in the
presupplementary motor area in updating motor plans. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U. S. A. 93, 8694–8698.
Stephan, K.M., Fink, G.R., Passingham, R.E., Silbersweig, D., Ceballos-
Baumann, A.O., Frith, C.D., Frackowiak, R.S., 1995. Functional
anatomy of the mental representation of upper extremity movements
in healthy subjects. J. Neurophysiol. 73, 373–386.
Stephan, K.M., Binkofski, F., Posse, S., Seitz, R.J., Freund, H.J., 1999.
Cerebral midline structures in bimanual coordination. Exp. Brain Res.
128, 243–249.
Sumner, P., Tsai, P.C., Yu, K., Nachev, P., 2006. Attentional modulation of
sensorimotor processes in the absence of perceptual awareness. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 103, 10520.
Tehovnik, E.J., Sommer, M.A., Chou, I.H., Slocum, W.M., Schiller, P.H.,
2000. Eye fields in the frontal lobes of primates. Brain Res. Rev. 32,
413–448.
Tucker, M., Ellis, R., 1998. On the relations between seen objects and
components of potential actions. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 24, 830–846.
Tucker, M., Ellis, R., 2004. Action priming by briefly presented objects.
Acta Psychol. (Amst) 116, 185–203.
Ullsperger, M., von Cramon, D.Y., 2001. Subprocesses of performance
monitoring: a dissociation of error processing and response com-
petition revealed by event-related fMRI and ERPs. NeuroImage 14,
1387–1401.
Vorobiev, V., Govoni, P., Rizzolatti, G., Matelli, M., Luppino, G., 1998.
Parcellation of human mesial area 6: cytoarchitectonic evidence for three
separate areas. Eur. J. Neurosci. 10, 2199–2203.
Wang, Y., Isoda, M., Matsuzaka, Y., Shima, K., Tanji, J., 2005. Prefrontal
cortical cells projecting to the supplementary eye field and presupple-
mentary motor area in the monkey. Neurosci. Res. 53, 1–7.
Wise, R., Chollet, F., Hadar, U., Friston, K., Hoffner, E., Frackowiak, R.,
1991. Distribution of cortical neural networks involved in word
comprehension and word retrieval. Brain 114, 1803–1817.
Wittfoth, M., Buck, D., Fahle, M., Herrmann, M., 2006. Comparison of two
Simon tasks: neuronal correlates of conflict resolution based on coherent
motion perception. NeuroImage. Accession number: 16677831.
Wolbers, T., Schoell, E.D., Verleger, R., Kraft, S., McNamara, A.,
Jaskowski, P., Buchel, C., 2006. Changes in connectivity profiles as a
mechanism for strategic control over interfering subliminal information.
Cereb. Cortex 16, 857–864.
Yamamoto, J., Ikeda, A., Satow, T., Matsuhashi, M., Baba, K., Yamane, F.,
Miyamoto, S., Mihara, T., Hori, T., Taki, W., Hashimoto, N., Shibasaki,
H., 2004. Human eye fields in the frontal lobe as studied by epicortical
recording of movement-related cortical potentials. Brain 127, 873–887.
Zilles, K., Schlaug, G., Geyer, S., Luppino, G., Matelli, M., Qu, M.,
Schleicher, A., Schormann, T., 1996. Anatomy and transmitter receptors
of the supplementary motor areas in the human and nonhuman primate
brain. Adv. Neurol. 70, 29–43.
